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ABSTRACT 
The patent regime is a quintessential notice 
system. Implicit in its design is the concept that 
one attempting to license a patent can identify 
those who hold the requisite rights and the 
territory that the patent holders claim. The 
modern system, however, bears little 
resemblance to the idealized form.  
In the last decade, an entire Hobbit’s world has 
been created under the foliage with little 
information available to inform the market. To 
address the problem, this Article suggests 
borrowing from doctrines related to disclosure in 
the realm of corporate securities, molding those 
doctrines to particular patent concerns.  
As a government grant, bestowed for 
constitutional purposes, a patent is an asset 
imbued with the public interest. Analogous to the 
trading of public securities, the trading of patent 
assets must be sufficiently transparent to ensure 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States patent system in recent years has
strayed far from the ideal reflected in its initial design. Crafted 
according to consequentialist notions of promoting the progress 
of the useful arts and utilitarian notions of maximizing that 
good, the patent system is quintessentially a notice system. 
Society provides strict liability for making, using, or selling a 
patented invention, in anticipation that all those who wish to do 
so are on notice by virtue of the grant and publication of the 
patent. Implicit in the patent system’s structure is the concept 
that one attempting to license a patent can identify those who 
hold the requisite rights, as well as being able to identify the 
territory that the patent holders claim as their own. 
In the quaint image embodied in the system’s design, 
one who wishes to manufacture a product can peruse the U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) files of active patents, 
identify any rights that might be implicated by the creation of 
the product, and appear on the patent holder’s doorstep, hat in 
hand. One is not guaranteed a license—withholding a patent is 
the patent holder’s prerogative, and the modern Patent Act 
underscores this latitude by specifying that failure to work the 
patent does not constitute patent misuse. Nevertheless, 
participants in the process are not expected to dance in the 
dark. 
As the system has evolved, however, it bears little 
resemblance to the idealized form. Scholars have identified 
systemic problems that prevent the system from realizing the 
ideal represented in its design. In particular, numerous scholars 
have written about flaws in the notice system that are 
attributable to the vast number of active patents and the lack of 
predictability in decision-making by federal circuit courts. In 
addition, this author has written from a theoretical perspective 
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particular patent, given the lack of a societally shared 
conception for things that are new, the difficulties inherent in 
language, and the impossibility of anticipating those yet 
uncreated inventions to which the patent language will be 
compared during the life of the patent.1  
Only recently, however, have scholars begun to address 
problems related to transparency of ownership within the 
modern patent system, largely because these problems have 
sprung up so recently.2 In particular, over the last five-to-seven 
years, an entire Hobbit’s world has been created under the 
foliage, a world in which sunshine rarely penetrates. 
The notion of transparency could include a wide variety 
of information, from licenses granted to valuation information. 
All such information arguably could promote more efficient 
bargaining in the market for patent monetization. This Article, 
however, focuses on one, limited aspect of transparency—that 
is, information related to those who have a financial interest in 
the patent. Identifying those interests can provide a small, but 
essential, step in ensuring the communication of sufficient 
knowledge for the players in the field. 
Even this limited idea is not without controversy. In 
opposition to notions of transparency, one aggregator has 
argued that even basic ownership structure should be private—
let alone information about beneficial interests. At an 
FTC/DOJ Workshop on patent assertion entities in 2012, a 
1 See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 13–23 (2012). 
2 For interesting explorations of transparency and modern ownership issues, 
see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE (2008); Mark 
Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 257 (2008); Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure &
Notice Externalities, 5 J.L. ANALYSIS 1 (2013); Michael Risch, Patent
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representative of aggregator Intellectual Ventures argued the 
following: 
We spend a lot of money and a lot of effort 
figuring out where to invest. And we don’t feel 
like tipping our hands on our investment 
policies and our investment intentions to our 
competitors. Warren Buffett doesn’t tell people 
where he’s investing until he’s forced to when 
he’s practically ready to take over a company. 
Disney doesn’t tell people when it[’]s buying 
swamp land in Florida that, hey, we’re planning 
to put a theme park over there.3 
 It is certainly true that secrecy in business transactions 
can have tremendous value for those who hold information that 
others in the market do not have. The question, of course, 
concerns the societal costs and benefits. The modern 
conception of a properly competitive market looks to the 
benefits for competition as a whole, not to the benefits for 
individual competitors. In a competitive environment, 
economists generally believe that information is a positive 
attribute and information asymmetries lead to market 
imperfections and distortions.  
As trading in patents develops into a more sophisticated 
and fluid market, society should think carefully about how that 
market functions. This is particularly appropriate in the case of 
3 Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Just., Patent Assertion Entity 
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patents, which are government-granted grants. One would be 
hard pressed to argue that society should tailor a system of 
government grants in a way that encourages information 
asymmetries.  
In addition to the notion of properly functioning 
markets, the information asymmetries implicated in the Walt 
Disney analogy are particularly problematic for a system 
intended to create incentives for inventors. As a Justice 
Department staff member noted, the Disney analogy implies 
that in the current environment, unsuspecting inventors will be 
under-compensated.4 Processes that take advantage of and dupe 
the small inventor are hardly consistent with the goals of the 
patent system.5 In short, from a societal perspective, stealth is 
not valuable to the patent system. Rather, stealth plays much to 
its detriment. 
This Article considers in depth the problem of 
transparency as a general matter and transparency of ownership 
in particular in modern patent law. Part II provides background 
on the patent system, from both a theoretical and a descriptive 
perspective, highlighting the patent system’s animating logic 
and the potential gaps between that logic and the system’s 
design. Part III describes the fact that scholarly discussions of 
notice concerns have focused largely on governmental actors 
and their role in ensuring that a patent can be properly 
understood and interpreted. In contrast, this Part argues that 
market information is an important element of the notice 
function of patents. One can think of the mechanisms for 
providing that market information broadly as “Transparency.” 
4 Id. at 64. 
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To address transparency insufficiency, one need not 
write on a blank slate. Part IV suggests a framework adapted 
from disclosure in the realm of corporate securities. In 
particular, this Article suggests borrowing from the substantial 
body of well-developed doctrine and literature associated with 
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, which is used for 
disclosure of interests in corporate securities. Part IV then 
explores the way in which these doctrines could be molded to 
the concerns in patent law.   
 Application of corporate securities disclosure law to 
patents is particularly appropriate in light of the analogous 
public interest. The public interest in securities disclosure rests 
with the publicly traded nature of the organization and 
society’s interest in a fair and optimally functioning stock 
market.  
 With patents, the asset itself is imbued with public 
interest by virtue of the fact that a patent is a government grant, 
bestowed only for purposes enshrined in the Constitution itself. 
As with the trading of public securities, the trading of an asset 
imbued with the public interest must be sufficiently regulated 
to ensure proper functioning of that trading market.  
II. WHY TRANSPARENCY IN GENERAL?
One must begin by asking whether any form of
transparency is a useful or necessary element for the patent 
system. Businesses frequently prefer not to disclose 
information, and there are certainly circumstances in which 
society erects barriers to protect commercial silence, 
particularly within the realm of intellectual property. For 
example, patent’s sister regime, trade secret, is entirely 
premised on the value of commercial secrecy, and the 
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silence. Copyright also has aspects of tolerating and even 
protecting non-communication. For example, un-
communicated writings can receive even greater protections in 
copyright than those that are published. Moreover, the modern 
copyright system no longer requires any semblance of notice or 
publication, having abolished both notice and deposit 
requirements in the 1980s.6 In other words, one need not make 
certain that the world has access to one’s original writings in 
order to protect those writings under copyright. 
In contrast to trade secret and copyright, however, the 
patent system traditionally has emphasized values such as 
notice, openness, and disclosure—areas that are related to 
transparency. In order to develop a deeper exploration of what 
transparency is and what aspects might be desirable for patents, 
this Article begins by looking at the theoretical concepts 
underlying the patent system. 
 In the historic, theoretical framework of the American 
patent system, patents are a limited government grant. From 
the store of those things that might otherwise be available to 
all, society dedicates a portion to the province of the few, in 
hopes that the benefit will redound to society as a whole.7 The 
portions dedicated are limited in both time and scope, with the 
footprint of the patent restricted to the incremental contribution 
that the patent holder has made to society.  
 One could construct a theoretical framework for 
intellectual property rights based on the natural or inherent 
6 S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706.  
7 Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
250, 252–53 (2013). These benefits include, among others, promoting 
innovation, encouraging the production of quality goods, and maintaining 
an appropriately functioning marketplace. 
2
2014 
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rights of the inventor. Similar frames can found in scattered 
pre-constitutional colonial history, as well as in certain corners 
of modern intellectual property rights of foreign nations. From 
at least the moment that intellectual property was enshrined in 
constitutional language, however, the American system of 
intellectual property in general, and patents in particular, has 
been decidedly utilitarian.8 According to this framework, 
society grants time-limited rights for the specific purpose of 
bringing about a particular societal consequence. In the case of 
patents, of course, that consequence is described as promoting 
the progress of the “useful [a]rts.”9  
 This consequence-based approach is critical for 
understanding the patent system. Although some popular 
commentary may wax poetic on the rights of the valiant 
inventor, the system is designed with larger societal goals in 
mind. 
 In pursuit of these goals, the patent regime is a 
communicative system, an approach evident throughout its 
language and design. Even the vernacular of patent law exudes 
its communicative function. In discussing a particular patent, 
for example, one speaks in terms of what the patent “teaches,” 
and one asks whether the patent “reads on” a particular accused 
device.   
                                                
8 For a detailed explanation of consequentialist versus rights-based 
jurisprudence and a description of how these concepts play out in the 
American patent system, see FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 76–78. See also 
Robin Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the Theory of General and 
Individual Taxation, 21 VA. TAX REV. 293 (2002) (explaining 
consequentialism and nonconsequentialism in the context of the 
philosophical roots of modern tax theory); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What 
Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patent? Reevaluating the Patent 
“Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007). 
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The design of the patent regime evidences the system’s 
communicative function. The powerful patent right is granted 
only in exchange for revealing to society the details of one’s 
innovation, details that will be free for all to use at the 
conclusion of the patent term. Tremendous judicial and 
jurisprudential energy is devoted to the question of ensuring 
that sufficient information is disclosed to justify granting patent 
protection to the inventor. In addition, the patent regime is 
quintessentially a notice system. As with its evolutionary 
ancestor, real property, the patent system is designed to provide 
notice to all of the boundaries of what is claimed in any 
particular patent. In fact, notice is considered so critical to the 
patent system that the government itself undertakes the 
responsibility of providing notice to the public of the patent 
territory that it has granted and the person to whom that 
territory was granted. Loosely similar to the modern recording 
system for land, the federal government in the form of the PTO 
publicizes the full text of the patent itself, as well as any 
written history of negotiations between the patent holder and 
the government examiners—a history that may be relevant in 
identifying territory that the patent holder tried and failed to 
secure. 
The terms “evolutionary ancestor” and “loosely 
similar” are used with great care in this Article to describe the 
relationship between patents and land. Although the patent 
system may indeed trace its lineage back to the system of real 
property, the modern patent system bears no more resemblance 
to land than modern humans resemble chimpanzees. They are 
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The distinction can be understood in reductionist form 
as the following:10 with land, society has some shared 
conception of what it is that one is trying to define, even if that 
conception is imperfect or incomplete at times. Patents, 
however, are granted on things that are new, and there are 
serious limitations in forming shared societal conceptions of 
things that are truly new. Worse yet, whatever language one 
chooses for the patent granted to the thing that is new, that 
language must be compared repeatedly to other products that 
did not exist when the patent was granted. Land does not suffer 
from this continual upheaval, and it is this perpetual unfolding 
of meaning that distinguishes the patent system sharply from 
systems related to land. 
 Nevertheless, the patent system is predicated on notice, 
and it applies a form of strict liability to those who would 
trespass. One who makes, uses, or sells a patented product, or a 
product embodying a patented process, is liable for patent 
infringement, regardless of whether the infringer independently 
invented it or had any direct knowledge of the patented 
invention. The patent system itself is intended to provide 
sufficient notice, a heavy responsibility given the potential 
consequences of violating someone’s patent.11 
10 For an extensive theoretical and descriptive discussion of why patents are 
not like real property, see FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 9–13, 211–12. The 
discussion of differences between patents and land is distinct from modern 
debates about whether the remedies in the patent system and whether these 
should follow so-called property rules or liability rules. See, e.g., Andrew 
Beckerman-Rodau, Patents are Property: A Fundamental but Important 
Concept, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87 (2009) (a shift to liability remedies in lieu 
of property remedies for patent infringement is unjustified). 
11 Infringers may be liable for damages or an injunction. A spate of large 
patent infringement awards demonstrates the potential cost of infringement. 
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 One could argue that the communicative function 
evident in patent law extends only to information about the 
scope of the patent. From this perspective, the patent would 
simply be a warning to “stay away,” and information on 
ownership would be irrelevant. This would, however, paint an 
odd economic picture in which a single inventor with a single 
patent moves forward in a solitary fashion to create a product 
requiring only that patent. The patent system is neither 
designed nor does it operate in this manner, and it would be 
economically irrational, if it did. Rather, trading and licensing 
historically has played an important role in the patent system, 
as patent holders seek out and find others who would 
commercialize their ideas in combination with the other rights 
necessary to create a viable product. Among other things, the 
patent system does not mandate vertical integration, a 
requirement that would be anathema to most modern 
economists. The following Parts examine the functioning of the 
modern patent system, exploring the ways in which ownership 
information contributes to the communicative and notice 
functions of the patent system. 
III. PATENT OWNERSHIP & THE ROLE OF MARKET
INFORMATION
Numerous commentators have written on the problem
of notice failure within the patent system. For example, a 2013 
governmental report, which cited scholars Bessen and Meurer, 
noted the following: 
In an optimal patent regime, patent property 
rights are clearly defined and easily determined 
so the world is on notice as to their existence, 
scope, and ownership. This “notice function” 
enables people to avoid infringement, negotiate 
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efficiency, such as by not keeping all inventions 
as trade secrets or doing R&D on inventions 
already claimed by someone else.12 
The report then notes that the notice system has 
particularly broken down in the information technology sector, 
given that claims have “fuzzy boundaries” and it is 
economically infeasible or irrational for parties to search 
through existing patents to avoid infringement.13  
Many scholars and commentators have described the 
vast and increasing number of active patents combined with the 
lack of predictability in judicial interpretation of patents.14  To 
12 BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
“PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 1 (2013).  
13 See id; see also FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 52–53; Jeanne C. Fromer, 
Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 721 (2009); Michael 
Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 179 (2007). 
14 See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful 
Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 177 (2005) (arguing 
that “[c]laim construction jurisprudence is in disarray” and noting that “the 
Federal Circuit reverses trial court claim construction decisions at a 
worryingly high rate”); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is 
Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 231 
(2005) (documenting a “concern among the bench and bar that the Federal 
Circuit’s de novo review of district court claim construction decisions and 
lack of guidance have caused considerable unpredictability”); see also 
Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 340 (2005) (discussing claims that the Federal Circuit 
engages in “erratic and unpredictable decision-making”); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, 
The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at 
the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1027, 1094 (2007) (arguing 
that despite the nearly seamless consensus of problems related to de novo 
review of patent claim construction, it is “the indeterminacy of patent law, 
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put it simply, there are millions of patents outstanding, and it is 
difficult to know how any particular court will interpret each 
one. Considering that patents may have dozens of claims, and 
that a patent suit could rely on only one of the claims, the 
problem multiplies. 
The difficulties may be more pronounced in some 
industries than in others, depending on the number of patents 
necessary to produce a typical product. Estimates suggest that 
300,000 patents may be relevant to the average smartphone, far 
more than the number of patents relevant to a drug derived 
from a single chemical formula. Even for biopharmaceuticals, 
however, one must consider more than the patent on the single 
chemical formulation. Relevant patents could include those 
related to methods of manufacturing the drug in a form that is 
stable and can be mass produced, dosage forms, methods of 
treatment, screening methods used to identify the drug and its 
treatment methods, and other ancillary technologies.15 
Scholarly works concerning notice failure in patents 
tend to focus on governmental actors and their role in ensuring 
that the scope of a patent can be properly identified. In 
particular, proposed doctrinal solutions have centered on Patent 
Circuit’s review of the district courts,” that “is responsible for the current 
circumstances of patent litigation”); John R. Thomas, Claim Re-
Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 87 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y	   781, 792–93 (2005) (discussing 
unpredictable judicial claim construction in the Federal Circuit); R. Polk 
Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 
1179 (2004) (concluding that whether the Federal Circuit is succeeding is 
an open question).   
15 See Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price, Patent Trolling—Why Bio & 
Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk (U.C. Hastings Research Paper No. 93, 2014), 
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& Trademark Office regulations regarding how a patent must 
be drafted and what types of patents should be approved, as 
well as judicial doctrines and procedures to ensure more 
predictable interpretation at the Federal Circuit level and at the 
trial courts.16 These are important considerations for enhancing 
the notice function of the patent system. One must also 
understand, however, the role that basic market information 
plays in ensuring a properly functioning patent system.17 
As noted in the author’s prior works, one tends to think 
of the moment of granting a patent as the moment in which a 
definitive definition is fixed.18 From that perspective, a judge’s 
role is to properly understand and interpret that definition. 
Meaning is contextual, however, and one cannot develop a 
complete understanding of the meaning of something without 
the full context of all those things that might or might not be 
included in the meaning. Whatever language one chose to 
describe the invention in a patent, that language must be 
compared to products and innovations that did not exist at the 
time of the patent grant. The inquiries the courts make will be 
guided by the serendipity of the products that emerge, with 
certain developments leading the courts to flesh out particular 
contours of the definition that would otherwise remain 
unexplored. This question and answer process ultimately 
results in a bounded set of rights, but one cannot know that 
bounded set of rights until the end of the twenty-year patent 
term, when all of the potential products have appeared and all 
16 For an excellent description of the problems of lack of transparency in the 
modern patent system, including the problems that lack of market 
information can provide, see Proposed Changes to Require Identification of 
Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105 (Jan. 24, 2014) [hereinafter 
Proposed Changes]. 
17 See Risch, supra note 2. 
18 For an extensive exploration of the concepts touched upon in this 
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of the questions that will be asked during that time have been 
asked. In other words, one cannot possibly know all of the 
contours of the definition of a patent, although certain doctrinal 
rules and structures will provide more efficiency in the 
development of that definition and in cabining the bargaining 
that occurs along the way. 
In this context, the actions of market participants will 
be critical for all parties trying to understand how a particular 
patent and its definition may be unfolding in the marketplace. 
The static information of the patent itself will never be 
sufficient. This is not to suggest that market forces should have 
the power to determine the boundaries of a patent. The territory 
that a patent holder asserts, and the fact that others acquiesce to 
that assertion by taking licenses, may represent no more than 
the relative power of those who hold the patent. It may also 
reflect the odd economics of current patent litigation, in which 
a patent holder can impose large costs and risks on those who 
are currently making a product, without incurring much cost or 
risk itself.19  
For example, a patent holder can file suit alleging 
infringement of a particular patent without specifying much 
more. This can impose a series of costs on the target company, 
which must try to analyze all of the claims in the patent, and all 
of its own products and activities, to look for any plausible 
reason for the allegation. Moreover, the cost to challenge a 
single patent in court can range from $600,000 to $6 million, 
19 For an excellent presentation of the economics of modern patent 
litigation, particularly as applied to patent monetization, see Colleen Chien, 
Patent Assertion Entities (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 (presentation 
to the DOJ/FTC Hearing on PAEs); see also Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl 
Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK, 
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with the amount increasing in cases of multiple patents or large 
portfolios. As a result, a patent holder can launch an attack on a 
target for a minimal expenditure, offering to settle below what 
it would cost the target to challenge the demand, or in some 
cases below what it would cost to fully analyze the demand. 
These economic realities may encourage target companies to 
settle, regardless of whether the patent is valid or validly 
asserted against them. 
For example, one technology company described the 
process pointedly in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court on 
the issue of awarding fees.20 The company noted that it has 
rarely lost a case brought by monetization entities, but that it 
has been forced to bear the legal costs: 
This reality is the lifeblood of the patent 
assertion industry. . . . Indeed, the opening line of many 
negotiations is some form of, “What we’re asking for is 
less than it will cost you to litigate this case to 
judgment.” It should come as no surprise, then, that 
despite its success in litigating the merits, for business 
purposes [our company] has agreed to a settlement in 
51 of the 57 closed cases.21 
In light of these patent litigation factors, the actions of 
market participants should not be relied upon to determine the 
proper boundaries of a patent. Nevertheless, such activity can 
provide important signaling information about how the market 
is unfolding and the territory claimed. 
20 Brief for Apple Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, 
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U. S. ____ 
(2014) (No. 12-1163), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/12-1163-12-
1184_np_amcu_apple.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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A focus on market information is particularly important 
at this stage in the evolution of the patent system. Although the 
licensing and trading of patent rights unrelated to product 
development is not new,22 the scope and scale of such modern 
activities are unusual. Large numbers of patents that would not 
have garnered a return in the past are being separated out from 
any underlying product and transferred in the form of 
commoditized, tradable rights.23 New types of large and 
complex entities have appeared on the scene, including mass 
aggregators and various forms of patent clubs. In addition, as 
the market for patent monetization has accelerated, variations 
on the theme have emerged, including product companies who 
enter the monetization market by creating monetization 
subsidiaries, transferring assets to third parties, or joining 
various patent buying clubs.24 Even universities have signaled 
their interest in entering the fray, with the Association of 
University Technology Managers announcing its intent to 
22 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, et al., Patent Alchemy: The Market for 
Technology in US History, 87 BUS. HIST. REV. 3, 21 (2013) (documenting 
attorneys who served as patent brokers in the nineteenth century); Gerard N. 
Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of 
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1809 (2007) (quoting Sen. Isaac 
Christiancy, 8 Cong. Reg. 307 (1878) for a colorful description of patent 
sharks). 
23 For a detailed description of the emergence of the modern market for 
patent monetization and the forms of entities that have emerged, see 
Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 7, at 264–68. See also 
Sara Jeruss, et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent 
Monetization Entities on U.S. Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. J. 357 (2012); 
Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1 (2012).	  
24 For an in-depth analysis of different types of patent trolling entities, see 
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 
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consider policies in support of transferring rights to 
monetization entities.25 
 As the market for patent monetization develops and 
expands, scholars and lawmakers must think of it in classic 
market terms. This includes, of course, ensuring the flow of 
information necessary to establish an efficiently functioning 
market. It is an ideal that remains far in the distance.  
A. Notice Failure: A Lack of Market Information
As described above, in an optimal patent system, the
world is on notice of the existence, scope and ownership of a 
patent. This information allows participants to avoid 
infringement, negotiate permission, and maximize innovation 
efficiency.26 The modern patent system, however, bears little 
resemblance to this ideal, even with information as basic as 
patent ownership. 
 For example, although initial ownership must be noted 
for the PTO when one files a patent, transfers of ownership are 
not always recorded. For example, in prior work tracing the 
thousands of shell companies established by a large patent 
aggregator, this author and a co-author noted examples in 
which patent holders announced a sale to the aggregator but 
there was no change in ownership recorded at the PTO for 
many years. 
25 See Paul Baskin, Under Financial Pressure, Universities Give Patent 
Buyers a Closer Look, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Oct. 25, 2013); see 
also Heidi Ledford, Universities Struggle to Make Patents Pay, NATURE 
(Sept. 24, 2013) (documenting examples of federally funded university 
patents that have been transferred to patent monetization entities). 
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 Even when formal ownership is properly recorded, such 
information represents the tip of the iceberg if one wants to 
understand who has the right to assert the patent—let alone 
how it has been asserted. Patent owners can transfer rights 
sufficient to assert a patent short of formally transferring 
ownership. For example, a university could grant an exclusive 
license to an entity. If worded properly, that license would give 
the entity not only the right to develop a product from the 
patent, but also the right to assert the patent against others. The 
exclusive license would not show up anywhere because 
licensing information is not recorded at the PTO, regardless of 
whether the license is exclusive or sufficient to allow assertion. 
 Ownership information can fall short in other ways as 
well. Suppose ownership is recorded at the PTO in the name of 
a parent company; the parent company has a number of 
subsidiaries, each of which holds a license to the patent. If a 
small business has paid for a license from the first subsidiary 
and is approached by the second subsidiary, it may be difficult 
for the small business to know that the subsidiaries are related; 
it may already hold a sufficient license.  
 Ownership information can be critical not just for 
licensing but also for challenging a patent. In this context, the 
complex structures of modern patent monetizers can be 
particularly difficult to penetrate. Consider the largest patent 
aggregator, Intellectual Ventures. With estimated holdings of 
30,000–60,000 patents worldwide, Intellectual Ventures has 
the fifth-largest patent portfolio of any domestic U.S. company 
and the fifteenth largest of any company in the world.27 
Working painstakingly from public sources, one can 
identify more than 1,200 subsidiaries associated with 
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Intellectual Ventures.28 These subsidiaries exist in obscure 
networks with the “parent” company, following structures 
permitted by the corporate laws in many states. In prior work, 
this author has described the complex ownership structure of 
one of the subsidiaries, whose organization is typical of the 
structures of modern mass aggregators.29 
 The layers of shell companies can make it difficult for 
those who receive patent demands to challenge the validity of 
the underlying patents or the appropriateness of the demand 
against them. Consider the Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund 
I LP case.30 Xilinx filed a declaratory judgment action 
challenging some of the patents asserted against it.31 The judge 
dismissed some of the parties that Xilinx named on the grounds 
that the patent owners were really seven other shell companies 
associated with the aggregator, rather than the ones Xilinx had 
named. In other words, Xilinx could not even tell who was 
asserting the patents against it so that it could sufficiently 
challenge those patents.  
28 See id. 
29 “Searete LLC, a fairly well-known Intellectual Ventures shell company 
that exemplifies the complicated ownership and management structures 
employed by mass aggregators. Searete has the type of complex and 
carefully woven legal structure that would make a defense lawyer beam 
with joy. It is a Delaware limited liability company with a presence in 
Nevada. Searete’s official manager in Nevada is ‘Nevada Licensing 
Manager, LLC,’ which is a Nevada corporation. Nevada Licensing 
Manager’s own manager is ‘Nevada Assets, LLC,’ which is a Delaware 
company. At some point, Nevada Assets, LLC presumably connects with 
Intellectual Ventures, LLC or one of Intellectual Ventures’ many 
investment funds. However, the connection might be little more than the 
ownership of shares, effectively rendering almost no one responsible for its 
actions.” See id. at 38 (footnotes omitted). 
30 Id. at 39–40 (citing No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 14, 2011)). 
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Although Intellectual Ventures is a mass aggregator 
with tens of thousands of patents, one can see similar 
structuring strategies at work with an example of a small 
player, MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC. Working with 
just five patents, the company created more than 100 
subsidiaries to assert those patents, sending thousands of letters 
to small businesses. Some of the small businesses received 
letters from more than one subsidiary across time. When the 
target is a small player with little knowledge of the patent 
system and patent licensing, this type of approach can result in 
multiple payments to what is essentially the same entity. 
To the extent it is difficult for a party accused of 
infringement to find information, the difficulty for those trying 
to understand if they might need to enter into a licensing 
arrangement and for whom to approach is even greater. As 
described above, one cannot rely on publicly recorded 
information at the PTO, in the way that one can rely on 
recorded land ownership. Market information is limited as 
well. Licenses and settlements by patent assertion entities are 
typically shrouded in strict nondisclosure agreements, which 
prevent the parties from revealing anything about the 
interaction. This secrecy blocks information from filtering into 
the market that would allow others to understand who is 
asserting the patent and what territory is being claimed. 
One might think that information would improve once a 
lawsuit is filed, given that lawsuits are a matter of public 
record. Although some information becomes available, the 
information is limited and not easily accessible. As a starting 
point, many monetization entities are organized as limited 
liability companies, with the result that information on related 
entities may be limited. Moreover, judges are frequently 
willing to seal documents, an action that has the effect of 
limiting the information that does arise.  In fact, much of the 
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mentioned above was originally sealed by a judge, who later 
chose to recuse herself from the case.32 The information was 
only released when a subsequent judge chose to grant the 
motion to make the information public. 
Information that does appear in litigation may be 
difficult for the public to access—even basic information such 
as whether a patent has been asserted in a lawsuit. In theory, 
the PTO’s public database includes information on whether a 
particular patent has been asserted in any lawsuits. That 
information, however, is questionable. A recent empirical study 
of all 15,000 patent lawsuits filed over four recent years, along 
with the 30,000 patents asserted in those lawsuits, determined 
that in two-thirds of the cases, the main PTO database failed to 
show the lawsuit. A less well-known PTO database related to 
freedom of information provides better coverage but still 
misses almost one-third of the instances in which lawsuits were 
filed.33 Most importantly, studies suggest that the vast majority 
of patent demands—perhaps more than 90 percent—never 
result in the filing of a lawsuit.34 Thus, the vast majority of 
information that might be available to the market remains 
hidden away.  
32 Id.  
33 Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded: Effects of Patent 
Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2014). 
34 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S.
INNOVATION (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS 
SECRETARY, FACT SHEET: WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON HIGH-TECH 
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B. Why Does Market Information on Patent
Ownership Matter?
In the context of modern monetization, market
information on patent ownership can make an important 
contribution to an efficiently functioning patent system. One 
can begin with the basic notion that markets function better 
when players in the market can identify each other. The ability 
to know who hold an asset and how to reach that party is an 
essential starting point for any market. This type of information 
can avoid the confusion and misinformation that can result in 
wasteful transaction costs. To put it simply, shell games and 
hide-and-seek rarely make for an efficiently functioning 
market. 
With patents, moreover, the rights are not one-
dimensional. Given the potential to separate and distribute 
patent rights in various configurations, identifying who is the 
“owner” of the right is only the beginning. Depending on the 
rights structure established for a particular patent, key 
questions could involve who has the right to assert the patent 
and who has control to varying extents of assertion of the 
patent. In light of the convoluted structures involved, 
understanding the money flow also can be an essential part of 
understanding who is in control.  
Identifying the parties can also provide information 
about the territory claimed. The ability to see who controls a 
patent and how that patent is being asserted can give notice to 
the public of what the patent holders believes is the appropriate 
footprint of the patent. That footprint may emerge not simply 
in one assertion but through the full body of assertions. In 
particular, a patent in one field that is being asserted in another 
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Market information also can be helpful in addressing 
the bargaining asymmetries reflected in the economics of 
modern patent assertion. Although it is certainly not a panacea, 
accused infringers may benefit from being able to understand 
clearly all of the parties who are involved in the patent, see 
others who have been targeted, and see the results of different 
assertions that the patent holder (and its entities) have made. 
Information on the various parties who have interests in 
the patent has efficiency implications for the judicial system as 
well. Properly identifying those with relevant interests can 
avoid duplicative filings and enhance the potential for an 
efficient settlement process. In this context, the court may 
benefit from being able to identify all of the relevant parties. 
This, of course, would only be useful if the court is able to 
bring those parties into the proceedings when appropriate; an 
issue that implicates judicial joinder rules. Nevertheless, the 
question of whether and when it is appropriate to join must 
begin with information on who is in the universe of potential 
interests. Such information provides the framework if courts or 
regulators wish to hold those with pecuniary interests 
responsible for damages that may have been imposed in the 
pursuit of their financial interests. 
One could argue that the process of eliciting 
information on the universe of potential parties will have 
judicial efficiency costs. Parties will have to spend time filing 
the information with the court, and disputes about the adequacy 
of information provided will, inevitably, arise. There are 
always costs associated with providing information to the 
market, however. The key is finding an appropriate mechanism 
to minimize those costs while providing the information 
necessary for efficient transactions and settlement. In addition, 
such costs are likely to pale in comparison to the current 
inefficiencies of the patent litigation system. Shadow boxing is 
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Finally, market information on the identity of those 
who hold interests in patents and the territory they are claiming 
with those patents is important from a societal perspective. 
With the emergence of the modern market for patent 
monetization, it will be essential to develop the type of 
oversight that can identify inappropriate behavior when it 
occurs and cabin that behavior, as well as identifying patterns 
that are likely to lead to market inefficiencies.  
Allowing vast networks of hidden behavior has the 
happy coincidence of preventing regulatory actors from 
observing problematic behavior. From a societal perspective, 
the result is less than optimal. Regulatory actors, such as public 
and private antitrust actors, as well as securities regulators 
where appropriate, must be able to connect the dots that would 
reveal a troubling picture. 
Such regulatory transparency is particularly important 
for patents. Patents are government grants, which are granted 
for specific constitutional and legislative goals. When an active 
and complex trading market develops for those grants, it is 
essential for society to have the ability to determine whether 
that market is functioning appropriately and whether it serves 
the goals of the system. 
C. Following an Established Path
Business environments thrive on stability, and
uncertainty can create friction in the market. Any transition 
toward transparency has the potential to create uncertainty for 
patent holders, as well as all players in the market. Thus, an 
optimal approach to transparency would benefit from an 
established set of legal doctrines that create analogies for the 
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 This article suggests that Section 16 of the Securities 
Laws provides an excellent framework for the transparency of 
beneficial ownership that would so greatly advance the 
interests of the patent system. The following section describes 
Section 16 and its applicability as a model for the patent 
system. 
IV. SECTION 16 AS A MODEL FOR A PATENT DISCLOSURE
¶ 1 As the legal system works toward a more powerful and 
effective disclosure framework for patent litigation, an 
especially fertile source of inspiration can be found in the area 
of securities law. A particularly promising starting point is 
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the 
Securities Act” or “the Act”), which mandates various financial 
disclosures by company insiders as part of the Act’s safeguards 
against insider trading.35 As mandated by the disclosure 
provision contained in Section 16(a), all company directors, 
officers, and beneficial owners of more than 10 percent of their 
company’s registered equity securities are required to file 
detailed reports about their equity holdings in the company.36 
The narrow goal of Section 16 is to deter short selling and 
profiteering in violation of fiduciary duty. More broadly, the 
transparency it mandates is intended to discourage improper 
behavior by making all relevant transactions public.  
¶ 2 Patent litigation could greatly benefit from the 
transparency provided by such disclosures, discouraging 
improper behavior by forcing parties to operate in the open.37 
35 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (2014). 
36 Id.	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A disclosure requirement based on Section 16 could make it 
much easier for defendants to identify the parent entities that 
are actually in control of the litigation filed against them, 
opening up new avenues for recourse and potentially 
discouraging questionable activity altogether. This Section will 
examine Section 16 as a model for disclosure reform, first by 
providing an overview of the law’s history, then by following 
up with a substantive analysis of relevant portions of the law, 
and finally by making recommendations tailored to patent 
law’s needs.  
A. Background on Section 16: Legislative History and
Rationale
Though securities regulation and patent law might seem
like strange bedfellows, they are actually quite similar at a 
conceptual level.38 Prohibitions against insider trading and 
patent infringement each aim to protect “the economic 
incentive to produce socially valuable information.”39 Just as 
innovators would lack the incentive to produce new products 
without patent protection, investors would not invest in a 
particular activity if “the profit from [that] activity is likely to 
be diverted” by insider trading.40  
An examination of the events that led to Section 16’s 
passage and its legislative history paints a picture of a 
controversial solution to an equally controversial problem, 
38 Michael Risch has even suggested that patent portfolios, such as those 
held by patent aggregators, could be treated as securities under 
interpretations of current securities law. See Risch, supra note 2. 
39 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
ECON. 772, 792 (2000).  
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resulting in a law that has been revisited and revised several 
times since its original passage. Patent law can learn much 
from that experience, stepping into the shoes of what is now a 
robust, and well-accepted, framework. 
The events that led to the passage of Section 16 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were the culmination of more 
than two decades’ worth of growing discontent over the impact 
of economic policies in the United States.41 In particular, the 
Panic of 1907 was a devastating banking crisis, triggered in 
large part when a handful of recklessly speculative business 
magnates tried and failed to corner the market on United 
Copper Company stock.42 Following that crisis, many 
Progressives became wary of the manner in which prominent 
financiers like J.P. Morgan consolidated their wealth and 
influence at the expense of competition.43 In this climate of 
suspicion towards the increasing consolidation in the financial 
sector, Democratic Congressman Arsene Pujo convened a 
series of hearings to determine the extent of the anticompetitive 
practices that had taken root.44 The hearings uncovered the 
41 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 7, 76 
(2003).  
42 ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 38 (2007).  
43 Id. at 182. The nature of the current market for monetization, with its 
opportunities for conflicts of interest and hidden trading, suggests the 
potential for some of the same issues that concerned legislators from this 
era. The parties themselves have difficulty keeping track of the web of 
relationships. For example, press articles have chronicled one patent auction 
in which the Chairman of one entity bidding on the patents was also an 
officer of another entity bidding on the same patents. See Roger Parloff, 
Taking on the Trolls, FORTUNE (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:54 AM), 
http://fortune.com/2014/02/27/rpx-taking-on-the-patent-trolls.  Although 
both entities were private, the episode demonstrates the Wild West nature of 
this emerging and largely unregulated market. 
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existence of massive joint accounts known as “pools,” in which 
prominent investors working with a broker coordinated the 
purchase and sale of large amounts of a particular security in 
order to manipulate its price.45 
As history would show, these pools contributed to the 
1929 stock market crash, which in turn led to the Great 
Depression. Section 16 grew from the reform efforts that 
targeted these pools during the push for reform after the 
crash.46 Although the Pujo Committee shined a spotlight on the 
existence of the pools in 1929, it was not until a series of 
Senate Banking Committee hearings in 1932 that Congress 
uncovered just how great the level of market manipulation had 
been in the course of the pools’ operation.47 In what became 
known as the Pecora Commission hearings, the Banking 
Committee found that the pools had actively manipulated the 
public by creating the false impression of demand for particular 
securities—even paying financial writers to write favorable 
articles about the securities to inflate prices.48 Once pool 
members had sufficiently drawn in enough of the public to 
drive the price of the security to sky-high levels, members 
would unload their shares.49 Revelations of other distasteful 
financial practices came to light during the hearings as well, 
but the extent of the evidence gathered made it clear that pool 
45 Report of the Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions 429 
and 504 to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit, 
H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 46 (1913).	  
46 PETER J. ROMEO & ALAN L. DYE, SECTION 16 TREATISE AND REPORTING
GUIDE 18 (2d ed. 2004). 
47 Id. at 17. 
48 Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking 
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operations were at the “heart of the problem[s]” that had led to 
the Crash.50  
Following the Pecora Commission hearings, House and 
Senate members introduced the bills that would eventually 
become the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including 
language that would become Section 16.51 Early on, the 
Section 16 disclosure requirements were hailed by the section’s 
proponents in Congress as one of the bills’ critical components. 
The requirement aimed to use transparency to ensure that 
company insiders would not act against the interests of other 
shareholders. By forcing insiders to publicize certain aspects of 
their financial dealings public, the sections strived to ensure 
that public scrutiny would force insiders to adhere to their 
fiduciary duties.52 Indeed, some observers viewed the 
disclosures as sufficient to curb insider trading on their own.53  
However, once legislators expanded the scope to 
include large shareholders, the disclosure requirements became 
the target of harsh criticism from the financial community. 
Subjecting directors and officers to the disclosure requirements 
was not initially controversial, particularly given the charged 
climate following the Pecora hearings.54 In fact, the record 
shows that members of Congress considered such a 
requirement in line with directors’ and officers’ common law 
duty of fiduciary loyalty and fair dealing as owed to their 
50 ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 18. 
51 Id. at 23.	  
52 2 FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, §8.01 (A.A. Sommer, 
Jr., ed., 2013). 
53 ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 24 (citing Stock Exchange Practices, 
supra note 48 (statement of Alfred L. Bemheim, Director of the Securities 
Markets Survey of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.)). 
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shareholders.55 Section 16 went beyond the traditional view, 
however, by applying disclosure requirements to large 
shareholders, who unlike officers and directors had not 
historically been regarded as having any common law moral or 
legal duty to other shareholders of the company.56  
Proponents of the provision reconciled the more 
expansive approach by arguing that “large shareholders [are] 
the equivalent of common law fiduciaries,” given that they are 
often in just as much of a position to “influence or control” a 
company’s board of directors as the actual directors 
themselves.57 Indeed, in some of the worst cases of insider 
misconduct uncovered by the Pecora Commission, financiers 
often fell into both categories, exercising control both through 
official title and through equity ownership.  Perhaps the most 
notorious was Albert H. Wiggin, Chairman of the Board of 
Chase National Bank, whose blatant profiteering through 
insider information was so notorious that Section 16 was 
commonly called the “anti-Wiggin” provision.58 
Another point of contention over shareholder 
disclosures was the percentage of ownership required before a 
person would be subject to Section 16. Advocates for the 
provision initially argued that the threshold should be 5 
percent, while those in opposition—chief among them the 
financiers who would be subject to the requirement—argued 
that it should be as high as 20.59 Although the House and 
Senate versions of the bill initially specified 5 percent, the 
55 See 78 CONG. REC. 8036–37 (May 3, 1934). 
56 ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 26. 
57 Id. at 27.	  
58 SELIGMAN, supra note 41, at 87. 
59 ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 27 (citing Stock Exchange Practices: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d and 73d 
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Senate version was amended to 10 percent.60 The Conference 
Committee adopted the Senate version, and Section 16 as it 
stands today contains a disclosure threshold of 10 percent.61  
B. SEC Rulemaking & The Modern Section 16(a)
Disclosure Requirement
Much has changed in the eight decades since passage
of the 1934 Securities Act. In particular, SEC rulemaking has 
clarified the requirements of the Act and the definition of those 
included under Section 16’s disclosure obligations. 
Understanding the modern application of Section 16 is critical 
for properly adapting those rules to the patent context. 
The key disclosure requirements in Section 16(a) are set 
forth in the first paragraph of Rule 16a-2, which specifies the 
categories of people who will be considered “insiders” subject 
to Section 16: 
Any person who is the beneficial owner, directly 
or indirectly, of more than ten percent of any 
class of equity securities (“ten percent beneficial 
owner”) registered pursuant to section 12 of the 
Act, any director or officer of the issuer of such 
securities, and any person specified in section 
30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
including any person specified in § 240.16a-8, 
shall be subject to the provisions of section 16 
of the Act.62 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 	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Essentially, Rule 16a-2 specifies that directors, officers, 
and beneficial owners of more than 10 percent of equity 
securities in the company must make financial disclosures.63 
Although the meaning of “director” has not been the subject of 
much controversy, the definition of “officer” as originally 
passed was widely seen as overly broad, while “beneficial 
owner” was not defined at all.64   
 To remedy the uncertainty that had developed 
surrounding these terms, the SEC in 1991 passed an overhaul 
of the Section 16 regulations.65 In a shift that is particularly 
relevant for our purposes, the 1991 changes altered the 
definitions in a manner that, taken as a whole, creates a wider 
variety of ways in which a person or entity can be shown to 
have control over a corporation. 
1. The Section 16 Beneficial Ownership
Requirement
The 1991 overhaul created a formal definition for the 
category of “beneficial owner.” This category, nevertheless, 
continues to have the greatest complexity in practice in part, 
because the term “beneficial ownership” has two different 
meanings, depending on the stage of analysis. The first 
definition of “beneficial ownership” applies at a threshold stage 
in which insider status is determined using a narrower 
definition found under Section 13(d). At this threshold stage, a 
beneficial owner is defined as a person who owns 10 percent or 
more of the company’s securities, “directly or indirectly, 
63 Id. 
64 ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 58. 
65 OWNERSHIP REPORTS AND TRADING BY OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND
PRINCIPAL SECURITY HOLDERS, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 34-28869, 48 
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through any contract, arrangement, understanding, 
relationship,” and who has voting or investment power over 
those securities.66   
 In keeping with Congress’ intent to apply Section 16 
only to those shareholders who can influence or control a 
company, the SEC also exempts from the category of 
“beneficial ownership” certain people and institutions who own 
equity for reasons not related to control or influence.67 These 
include brokers, banks, insurance companies, and mutual 
funds, among others.68 
 Beneficial ownership can arise under Section 13(d) in 
an anticipatory manner. A person is a beneficial owner of 
shares not yet acquired if he or she has the right to acquire 
them within sixty days.69 In addition, when two or more people 
“agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, 
voting or disposing of equity securities of an issuer,” the group 
they form is collectively considered a beneficial owner.70 
Given that it may be difficult to recognize the creation of a 
Section 13(d) group “at the time of the group’s formation,” and 
that a group’s existence, as far as statutory requirements are 
66 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3. According to the 1991 SEC release outlining the 
Commission’s Section 16 overhaul, the rationale behind the use of the 
Section 13(d) definition was to effect Congress’ intent to apply Section 16 
to those that can influence or control a company through their equity 
ownership. See 1991 SECTION 16 OVERHAUL, supra note 65, at 236. Given 
that Section 13(d), like Section 16, was also intended to cover 
circumstances in which a party could potentially gain control over a 
company through accumulation of equity, the Commission reasoned it was 
appropriate to reference the 13(d) definition. ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, 
at 108.  
67 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(1). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. § 240.13d-3(d)(1)(i). 
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concerned, may be understood after the fact, beneficial 
ownership by a group provides perhaps one of the most 
common ways to incur liability under Section 16.71 
 One should note that corporations, partnerships, LLCs, 
and other entities also can be beneficial owners under Section 
16.72 When a corporate subsidiary is deemed a beneficial 
owner of certain securities, each upper-level subsidiary in the 
corporate hierarchy is also deemed a beneficial owner, given 
that each has the ability to take control of subsidiaries “below it 
in the chain.”73  
 The determination of beneficial ownership, however, is 
less cut-and-dried in the case of independently-operated 
business units. In 1998, the SEC published an interpretive 
position stating that under certain circumstances, shares owned 
by independently-operated business units do not have to be 
attributed to the parent company for the purpose of determining 
beneficial ownership. Relevant factors include whether or not 
the business units are truly independent of the parent 
company.74 
 Given the extent to which patent aggregators utilize 
corporate structures that obfuscate both the chain of command 
and the extent to which their subsidiaries operate 
independently, one might be concerned that if Section 16 rules 
were adopted in the patent context, aggregators might develop 
structures designed to avoid parent reporting responsibilities. 
The SEC’s Section 16 analysis, however, adopts from Rule 
71 ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 88.	  
72 Id. at 122. 
73 Id. at 122–23. 
74 AMENDMENTS TO BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING REQUIREMENTS §
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13d-3(b) a comprehensive provision preventing such evasive 
behavior. The regulation holds that if a party is found to have 
created any sort of arrangement designed to avoid beneficial 
ownership, the party will be found to have beneficial 
ownership nevertheless: 
Any person who, directly or indirectly, creates 
or uses a trust, proxy, power of attorney, 
pooling arrangement or any other contract, 
arrangement, or device with the purpose of 
effect of divesting such person of beneficial 
ownership of a security or preventing the 
vesting of such beneficial ownership as part of a 
plan or scheme to evade the reporting 
requirements of section 13(d) or (g) of the Act 
shall be deemed for purposes of such sections to 
be the beneficial owner of such security.75  
2. Section 16 and the Notion of “Pecuniary
Interest”
As described above, the term “beneficial ownership” 
has two different meanings, depending on the stage of analysis, 
with the narrower definition applying at a threshold stage. The 
second definition of “beneficial ownership” turns on the 
concept of “pecuniary interest,” and this is what governs the 
actual disclosures that must be made under Section 16(a). 
Specifically, a person or company must disclose any securities 
owned for which the person or company is a “beneficial 
owner,” defined in Rule 16a-1(a)(2) as “any person who, 
75 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b); see also CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund 
Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 292 F. 
App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 654 
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directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, 
understanding, relationship or otherwise, has or shares direct or 
indirect pecuniary interest in the equity securities.”76 The rule 
defines a pecuniary interest generally as the “opportunity, 
directly or indirectly, to profit or share in any profit derived 
from a transaction in the subject securities.”77 The regulations 
contain a “safe harbor” exemption that protects ordinary 
shareholders who lack investment or voting control over their 
securities from being found to have a pecuniary interest.78 
 While the rules do not further elaborate on the notion of 
a “direct pecuniary interest,” they do go into more detail 
regarding the “indirect pecuniary interest” standard, which was 
added as part of the SEC’s 1991 clarifying rules and serves to 
significantly broaden the range of disclosures required under 
Section 16.79 Under the indirect pecuniary interest standard, an 
insider would have to file a disclosure if that person has a right 
to payment “based on” the profits from another person’s 
securities transaction, even if that person has no right to the 
actual profits.80  
 The rules further specify six situations in which an 
“indirect pecuniary interest” exists “in any class of equity 
securities.” These include shares held by members of a 
person’s immediate family that live in the same household; a 
general partner’s interest in the shares held by the partnership; 
performance-related fees collected by fiduciaries such as 
brokers, banks, and insurance companies; separable dividend 
76 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2). 
77 Id. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(i). 
78 Id. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(iii). 
79 STANTON P. EIGENBRODT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECTION 16:
REPORTING AND COMPLIANCE 2-12 (2003).	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rights; certain trust interests; and the right to acquire shares 
through a derivative security.81 
 The rules specify, however, that the list of arrangements 
is not exclusive.82 The existence of a pecuniary interest can be 
a fact-specific inquiry, and some courts have exercised 
significant interpretive discretion in inferring the existence of a 
pecuniary interest.83 
C. Lessons from Section 16
The statutory requirements for beneficial ownership and
pecuniary interests, combined with SEC guidance and judicial 
interpretation of these concepts, reflect the wisdom gained 
from years of avoidance techniques. The long and detailed 
history surrounding Section 16’s disclosure requirements 
provide ample interpretive context regarding how such 
requirements operate when challenged by market actors who 
may prefer to avoid disclosure. The experience gained through 
such a rich legacy would be invaluable when crafting corporate 
disclosure requirements in another context.  
 The notion of stemming avoidance techniques is 
particularly important in the context of modern patent 
monetization. Patent assertion entities have proven as creative 
as the inventors whose patents they purchase—at least from the 
81 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(ii). 
82 Id. 
83 See Strauss ex rel. Servico, Inc. v. American Holdings, 902 F. Supp. 475, 
481 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that “[w]hile the Court recognizes that the 
failure to come within a ‘safe harbor’ does not ipso facto mean that a 
defendant is lost at sea, the policies of Section 16 warrant the conclusion 
that the complaint sufficiently alleges facts from which an inference of 






Vol. 19  No. 01 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
standpoint of legal structuring. As the PTO observed, some use 
complicated corporate structures and licenses to hide their 
identities from the public.84 Regulatory frameworks that do not 
anticipate such creativity are likely to be ineffective. Worse 
yet, failure to anticipate such legal creativity could have the 
unintended effect of worsening anticompetitive behavior in the 
field of patent monetization. Large, sophisticated players may 
be able to restructure their portfolios while the new legislation 
or regulation conveniently eliminates their smaller, less 
sophisticated competition. Such consolidation within any 
market would be undesirable, particularly if the government is 
an unwitting participant in the process. 
D. Adapting Section 16 for a New Patent Litigation
Disclosure Framework
The securities regulation framework could be adapted
comfortably to the patent law context in the following manner. 
Section 16’s touchstone is equity securities, with the disclosure 
requirements attaching in relation to ownership or interests in 
those securities. Applying these concepts to the patent market, 
the similar touchstone would be the patent itself, with the 
disclosure requirements attaching in relation to ownership, 
control, or interests in the patent.  
 Monetizers organized as limited liability companies 
may be tempted to object that the application of doctrines 
related to public companies should not be imported to apply to 
them. After all, they are not publicly traded entities but remain 
private companies or partnerships. The public interest, 
however, attaches not to the status of their organization but to 
the status of the asset they have the potential to trade. That 
asset is imbued with public interest by virtue of the fact that it 
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is a government grant, bestowed only for purposes enshrined in 
the Constitution itself. As with the trading of public securities, 
the trading of an asset imbued with the public interest must be 
sufficiently regulated to ensure proper functioning of that 
trading market.  
 With securities law as a reference, any transparency 
requirements for patents should include two key concepts. The 
first concept concerns the potential to benefit from assertion of 
the patent asset; the second concerns structures designed to 
evade the regulatory definitions established. 
 First, to properly capture the range of ways in which a 
party might benefit from assertion of a patent, one would need 
a broad definition—and one that is tailored specifically to the 
modern patent monetization market. As described above, of 
course, assertion of the patent refers not only to filing a lawsuit 
but also to making patent demands outside of litigation. Thus, 
the category of those who would benefit from assertion of a 
patent includes not just those who would receive the proceeds 
from a lawsuit settlement, but also those who would receive 
proceeds from the patent outside of a lawsuit. 
 On a basic level, one would ideally want to know where 
the money is flowing. This would include securities law 
concepts such as “beneficial ownership” and “pecuniary 
interest,” including notions related to the “opportunity, directly 
or indirectly, to profit or share in any profit derived from a 
transaction . . . .”85 On another level, one would want to know 
about voting and investment power. Securities law concepts 
also may be helpful here as in identifying those who have 
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voting or investment control over any entity with the ability to 
assert the patent.86   
 On a more subtle level, regulators in particular would 
want to be able to identify less formal group behavior. For 
example, suppose a group of companies forms a limited 
liability company and hires a management company to exploit 
a particular patent. One could imagine a large company 
providing funding or other support to the patent holding entity, 
not to receive any compensation from assertion of the patent 
but in order to destabilize a competitor. Moreover, other 
support could come in the form of offering database resources 
to analyze the patent or identify potential targets, marshaling 
legal resources, or other actions. 
 It is possible that certain securities law concepts might 
cover aspects of this issue. Arguably, the notion of profiting 
indirectly, which is contained in the language of “opportunity, 
directly or indirectly, to profit or share in any profit derived 
from a transaction” could cover that circumstance.87 Similarly, 
the securities law concept of beneficial ownership contains a 
concept of group action, noting specifically that when two or 
more people “agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, 
holding, voting or disposing of equity securities of an issuer,” 
the group they form is collectively considered a beneficial 
owner.88 Nevertheless, given the history of avoidance 
structures in patent monetization, any legislative or regulatory 
86 Id. § 240.13d-3(a), (d)(1)(i) (specifying that a person is a beneficial 
owner either if he or she has voting or investment control over shares 
already owned, or if a person is a beneficial owner of shares not yet 
acquired if he or she has the right to acquire them within sixty days).	  
87 Id. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(i). 
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regime would benefit from defining the meaning of the term 
explicitly and expansively, as well as offering examples. 
 The potential for avoidance leads to the second concept 
that would be essential for any patent transparency regime. The 
disclosure language must encompass, and indeed anticipate, 
attempts to develop structures that will slide between the 
examples and definitional language provided. One would want 
to adopt a regime loosely analogous to the step transaction 
doctrine in tax law, in which regulators collapse the steps of a 
transaction when it is structured for avoidance.89 Once again, 
the securities law language includes within the definition of 
beneficial owner those who directly or indirectly create devices 
to evade reporting requirements.90 
 Finally, securities law contains an exemption from 
reporting requirements for certain categories of people and 
institutions, such as brokers, banks, insurance companies, and 
mutual funds. These are exempted on the grounds that they 
own equity for reasons not related to control or influence.91 
Given the structure of certain aggregators and the temptations 
for avoidance, one would want to draft any such exemption 
with extreme care. For example, some patent aggregators are 
89 See Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 7, at 310 
(suggesting analogies to the step transaction doctrine as part of a proposal 
for a judicial doctrine of inappropriate use of intellectual property). 
90 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b) (specifying that “[a]ny person who, directly or 
indirectly, creates or uses a trust, proxy, power of attorney, pooling 
arrangement or any other contract, arrangement, or device with the purpose 
or effect of divesting such person of beneficial ownership of a security or 
preventing the vesting of such beneficial ownership as part of a plan or 
scheme to evade the reporting requirements of section 13(d) or (g) of the 
Act shall be deemed for purposes of such sections to be the beneficial 
owner of such security”).	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organized as investment funds, and one would not want to 
allow the definition of mutual fund to expand to exempt these 
entities from transparency requirements. 
 Timing of the disclosure obligation will be important 
both for market players and for patent holders themselves. Too 
frequent disclosure over-burdens the patent holder while 
infrequent disclosure leaves market players in the dark and 
allows game-playing. As described below in Section E, the 
PTO has, at times, proposed disclosure requirements in 
conjunction with maintenance fees and post-grant proceedings. 
Section E will discuss why such timing is insufficient for 
adequate disclosure.  
 An effective transparency regime could require 
disclosure at several points in the life of a patent. These could 
include critical moments—such as the patent application, the 
patent grant, transfer of ownership, maintenance fees, lawsuits, 
and post-grant review, in addition to update requirements on an 
annual or sufficiently frequents basis. For those who are 
concerned that individual patent owners will be hurt by their 
inability to follow transparency requirements, the system could 
provide mitigation opportunities for small players, for example, 
allowing small players to cure a defect upon request. When 
small players trade with large players, however, obligations on 
the large players would prevent the creation of loopholes that 
sophisticated players could exploit. No disclosure system could 
eliminate all opportunities for strategic behavior, but a well-
crafted regime that relies on the history of corporate securities 
disclosure could provide for a more efficient and smoothly 
functioning patent market. 
E. Comparative Proposals
As concerns have mounted over the lack of information
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the PTO have floated various proposals.92 Any transparency 
would be an improvement over the status quo, and even a small 
amount of sunshine would be a welcome relief. Thus, even the 
narrowest of proposals has merit, although some approaches 
have greater potential for bringing forth significant 
information. Nevertheless, these proposals would not 
necessarily result in a level of transparency commensurate with 
the full information necessary for rational patent behavior and 
an optimally functioning market. 
 Looking first at the PTO proposals, in 2012, the PTO 
published proposed requirements for recordation of “real-party-
in-interest information” when a patent is pending and during 
the patent term.93 In addition to the benefits of more effective 
market clearing, the PTO notice cited the importance of aiding 
the agency in its operations by ensuring that any proceedings 
are authorized by the prior owner and ensuring that the PTO’s 
own officials would know when to recuse themselves. Other 
92 As of publication of this article, the PTO’s Deputy Director has indicated 
that the Office is not planning to act on those proposals, deferring instead to 
Congress to address the issue. See Ryan Davis, USPTO Backs Away from 
Patent Transparency Rules, LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2014, 4:48 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/590197/uspto-backs-away-from-patent-
transparency-rules (speech by USPTO Deputy Director Michelle Lee). For 
an interesting discussion of potential statutory authority for the Patent & 
Trademark Office to promulgate transparency requirements, and limits on 
that authority absent congressional action, see Dennis Crouch, Whither the 
USPTOs Authority to Require Ownership Recordation, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 
10, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/02/authority-ownership-
recordation.html.   
93 Notice of Roundtable on Proposed Requirements for Recordation of Real-
Party-in-Interest Information Throughout Application Pendency and Patent 
Term, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,385 [hereinafter USPTO Proposed Rules] (proposed 
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concerns included resolving prior art issues and properly 
initiating third-party proceedings.94 
The PTO proposed two alternative definitions of real-
party-in-interest, both of which were offered for public 
commentary. The first definition was “necessary and sufficient 
to bring a legal infringement action.” The second definition 
was “the ultimate parent entity,” which was further defined as 
“an entity which is not controlled by any other entity.”  
Both definitions for real-party-in-interest reference 
legal doctrines that would be far too narrow to ensure 
transparency. The first concept, as well as the actual term “real-
party-in-interest” itself, references the disclosure required in 
some jurisdictions that would allow judges to decide whether 
they must recuse themselves from a case.95 Such conflicts of 
interest typically arise if the judge has an investment in a 
company with a direct interest in the proceeding.96 It is this 
requirement that eventually revealed the names of those who 
had invested in certain funds organized by the mass aggregator, 
Intellectual Ventures in the Xilinx case.  
The real-party-in-interest concept, however, applies in 
drastically limited circumstances. For example, although real-
party-in-interest may reveal investors, those who invest in a 
fund may not be the same as those who control the decision 
making for the entity running the fund or related entities. Nor 
does real-party-in-interest information communicate the 
relationships among various shell companies and entities, 
94 See id. at 70387. 
95 For a short discussion of the rules in various federal and state 
jurisdictions related to revealing interested parties for the purposes of 
judicial recusal, see Ewing & Feldman, supra note 23, at text accompanying 
notes 200–20. 
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disclosure that would be necessary for providing full market 
information. 
From this perspective, the Xilinx case itself is 
instructive. Knowing the names of the investors in the 
aggregator’s fund did not help Xilinx determine which shell 
companies were the proper ones to include in the lawsuit 
challenging the validity of the patent.97 
The second definition regarding ultimate parent entity 
specifically references the antitrust laws regarding mergers and 
acquisitions. In particular, the PTO references sections related 
to what is known as the “Hart-Scott-Rodino” threshold, which 
designates the point at which one must file with the Federal 
Trade Commission for antitrust clearance of a merger or 
acquisition. 
   Although casting a broader net than judicial recusal, 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino sieve is aimed at capturing large players. 
Information sufficient for an optimally functioning patent 
market, however, would be necessary for a patent regardless of 
whether the patent holder is a large or small player. In addition, 
even where anticompetitive behavior is concerned, the Hart-
Scott-Rodino threshold may be ineffective in the complex 
patent monetization world. One can see the limitations of the 
traditional antitrust thresholds for modern patent monetization 
both in theory and in practice. 
 From a theoretical perspective, this author has written 
extensively about the way in which current antitrust doctrines 
might fall short in failing to measure potential rent-seeking 
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behavior in the market for patent monetization.98 Behavior in 
which patent holders pursue returns above the economic value 
of their patents can have a significant impact on consumer 
prices and consumer welfare.99 Most important, in the context 
of the economics of patent litigation and modern monetization 
techniques, smaller groupings can have impact within a 
product market. 
 The concern, however, is more than theoretical. This 
author chronicled the rise of one product company that 
purchased a set of broadly worded patents and asserted them 
aggressively against competitors, as well as engaging in an 
expansive acquisition campaign of buying more than twenty 
competitors and patent portfolios in the field. None of the 
individual transactions, however, appears to have triggered the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting requirements.100 The point is 
simply that antitrust thresholds are unlikely to be sensitive 
enough to serve as the appropriate analogy for patent 
transparency regulations.101   
 After more than a year of public commentary, the PTO 
published a revised set of proposals for comments. Published in 
98 See Feldman, supra note 7, at 303–05 (explaining, among other issues, 
that the market for patent monetization must be understood as a market 
itself, and the potential for	  competitors	  to	  collude	  within	  that market or to 
use combination mechanisms in that market to stamp out next-generation 
substitutes for current products). 
99 Id. at 304. 
100 For a detailed description, see id.at 288–94.	  
101 In the antitrust context, European Union rules for determining whether a 
transfer of control has occurred are more sensitive. The test considers 
whether a party has achieved “the possibility to exercise decisive influence” 
over an undertaking. See, e.g., Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional 
Notice Under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the Control of 
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January of 2014, the new proposals move away from the notion 
of “real-party-in-interest” replacing that concept with a 
requirement to disclose who actually holds the title to the 
patent, as well as reporting what is termed enforcement 
entities, ultimate parent entities, and hidden beneficial owners. 
The 2014 proposals were a stronger effort to strike at the heart 
of the patent transparency problems.  
 Enforcement entities are described as those necessary to 
be joined in a lawsuit to have standing to enforce a patent. The 
rule would require disclosure of exclusive licensees in some 
cases. Ultimate parent entities are defined, once again, in 
reference to the Hart-Scott-Rodino regulatory requirements—
the limitations of which are discussed above. Hidden beneficial 
owners are described as those who try to avoid the need for 
disclosure by temporarily divesting themselves of ownership 
rights through contractual or other arrangements.  
The concept of casting the net widely to include those 
who are trying to hide is an important one in patent 
monetization. Looking only for those who temporarily divest, 
however, could risk missing a considerable amount of evasive 
behavior. Complex patent aggregation and monetization 
entities may be permanently designed to avoid transparency, 
neatly bypassing requirements related to temporary divestment. 
The hidden beneficial owners section does explain that the 
section is “designed to discourage intentional shielding of such 
ownership interests,” language that could conceivably apply 
more broadly than temporary structures. Following on the heels 
of the “temporary divestment” language, however, the broader 
language could have significant difficulty standing on its own. 
Calibrating the notion of hidden beneficial owners will 
be critical to transparency. For example, National Public Radio 
has reported on the shell company “Oasis Research,” noting 





Vol. 19  No. 01 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
Intellectual Ventures. At a panel at Stanford Law School, one 
of the founders of Intellectual Ventures suggested that 
Intellectual Ventures always sues in its own name. When asked 
about the lawsuits filed by Oasis Research, the Intellectual 
Ventures founder responded that Intellectual Ventures has 
simply sold the assets to, and does not control, Oasis 
Research.102 This perspective is an example of how entities 
have already structured their relationships with shell companies 
to obtain the financial benefits, while maintaining sufficient 
distance to try to avoid disclosure obligations that might be 
imposed in the future. 
The timing requirements of the PTO 2014 proposal are 
seriously limited as well.  Patent applicants are required to 
provide information at the time of filing for a patent and have 
an ongoing obligation to update information while the patent is 
pending. Once the patent issues, however, the patent holder is 
only required to update information when maintenance fees are 
due and at the time of any post-issuance proceedings before the 
PTO. Maintenance fees are due only three times in the twenty-
year life of a patent, at three years, seven years, and eleven 
years.103 
The advantage of limiting transparency requirements to 
these few moments lies in the lower production burden on 
patent-holders. Modern patent monetization takes place 
throughout the life of the patent, however, and occasional 
information does not provide the robust information necessary 
for an openly functioning market.  
102 Peter Detkin, Founder, Intellectual Ventures, Panel Discussion II at the 
Stanford Law School Conference on Patent Trolls and Patent Reform (Mar. 
21, 2014) (author on panel).  
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 Various legislative proposals have been introduced at 
various times in Congress as well. These have generally 
focused on transparency during litigation. As described above, 
only a small percentage of patent demands ever reach the 
courthouse. Thus, although such transparency proposals are an 
important improvement over the status quo, their reach is 
limited. In addition, the Congressional proposals focus on 
disclosing those who have a direct financial interest in the 
patent at issue in the litigation, including the right to any part 
of the award. These proposals would benefit from reference to 
the securities law concepts described above, particularly in 
expanded form.  
 In short, even if the Section 16 framework is not 
adopted whole cloth, reference to the concepts of Section 16 
may be helpful for ensuring transparency of market 
information in patents. Thus, the more limited proposals 
described above can themselves benefit from reference to those 
concepts, either at the time of passage by legislative and 
regulatory bodies or at the time of judicial interpretation. 
Referencing the securities regulation framework for terms such 
as beneficial and pecuniary interest and the avoidance language 
brings the wisdom of experience gained with the use of those 
terms across time.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The patent system has evolved dramatically in recent 
years, with the development of an active trading market for 
patents and the creation of complex and multi-layered 
structures for patent ownership. These developments impede 
the flow of market information that can allow participants to 
understand even basic issues, such as patent ownership. Such 
fundamental information is essential for ensuring a properly 
2
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functioning patent market, one that is as efficient as possible in 
its pursuit of the constitutional and legislative goals.  
  In choosing a method for providing such information 
to the market, however, one need not write on a blank slate. 
The provisions of the securities laws that relate to disclosure of 
ownership interests, particularly Section 16, provide a useful 
framework that could be adapted to the disclosure needs of the 
patent regime. As with the trading of public securities, the 
trading of an asset imbued with the public interest must be 
sufficiently regulated to ensure proper functioning of that 
trading market, particularly when the type of asset is so 
essential for companies throughout the economy. 
 The value of the Section 16 disclosure provisions lies in 
their ability to reach both strategic and financial lines. Creating 
market transparency for patents will require both of these 
elements, in light of the complexity of modern patent 
monetization.  
 The Section 16 approach also has the advantage of 
providing a robust body of interpretative case law. With more 
than twenty years of interpretation of terms such as “beneficial 
ownership” and “pecuniary interest,” the securities regulatory 
framework can mitigate the uncertainty that may accompany 
any new regulatory regime. Although certainly not perfect, the 
number of issues explored and clarified would provide a head 
start for an analogous disclosure regime. 
 
